Abstract: The case study in this paper concerns a street performance band in Wuhan, each of whose members is under contract as a live streamer. Borrowing from Michael Burawoy's concept of “the game of making out”, this study describes the labor control mechanism in the live streaming industry as a “game of popularity”. Popularity is a pivotal indicator of labor price, determining the compensation of contracted live streamers. However, this seemingly objective popularity indicator can in fact be manipulated. Both live streamers and platform providers can benefit from purchasing “fake popularity”. In the game of popularity manipulation, the interests of capital and labor are conjoined, and consensus reached. In collaboration, live streamers become co-conspirators of capital and thus lose control over their own labor output, and the relation between labor input and compensation is distorted. By participating in this manipulation, live streamers help affirm the ideological dominance of the platform economy. The neoliberal work ethic that emphasizes individual responsibility conceals the power relationship behind unstable employment modes like live streaming. Despite being horrendously exploited, live streamers still think of themselves as someone with an “independent destiny”. The online platform economy has transformed the labor–capital relationship. The earnings distribution system, in combination with other social factors, often plays a vital role in labor control. Therefore, understanding this system and its influence on labor processes and ideology is the correct way to start for any exploration of concepts such as the “industry regime” or “sector regime”.

Key words: Live streamers, earnings system, the game of popularity, labor processes, platform economy